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This paper investigates whether ’tough’ bargaining behavior, which gives
rise to ineﬃciency, can be evolutionary stable. We show that in a two-stage
Nash Demand Game tough behavior survives. Indeed, almost all the surplus
may be wasted. These results diﬀer drastically from those of Ellingsen’s model
(Ellingsen (1997)), where bargaining is eﬃcient. We also study the Ultimatum
Game. Here evolutionary selection wipes out all tough behavior, as long as the
Proposer does not directly observe the Responder’s commitment to rejecting
low oﬀers.
Keywords: Bargaining, commitment, toughness, eﬃciency, evolutionary sta-
bility.
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1 Introduction
An important insight, due to Thomas Schelling (Schelling (1960)), is the role commit-
ment can play in bargaining. The beneﬁts from commitment come about when the
committed player persuades the opponent to give away a large share of the surplus.
The costs of commitment is that the opponent may also have committed himself, such
that disagreement may result. Furthermore, even when the opponent has not com-
mitted himself, he may not, due to insuﬃcient information, realize that the player is
committed, in which case disagreement may again occur.
∗I thank Craig Brett and Abhinay Muthoo for very helpful comments. I am, of course, responsible
for any errors.
1In this paper we investigate how, in an evolutionary equilibrium, these beneﬁts and
costs are related. We will say that a player who is committed to getting more than half
of the surplus is a ’tough’ player. Since any two such players will disagree, the existence
of tough players implies bargaining ineﬃciency. We wish to analyze the extent to which
such bargaining behavior can be part of an evolutionarily stable outcome. A result
that tough bargaining behavior survives would diﬀer substantially from rationality-
based models of bargaining with commitment. Here players do not make incompatible
commitments and bargaining is eﬃcient, unless there is some uncertainty (e.g. about
players’ payoﬀs or the size of the surplus). We refer the reader to Muthoo (1999), Ch.
8, where such bargaining models, and others that are related to the ones studied here,
are analyzed and discussed.
We consider two well-known and simple bargaining games: A variant of the Nash
Demand Game (Nash (1953)) and an Ultimatum Game. In the evolutionary model,
a large population of players is randomly and repeatedly matched over time to play
some ’stage game’, this being one of the two above-mentioned games. Some players are
socially ’programmed’, or committed, to a certain ﬁxed bargaining behaviour, while
other players, called ’optimizers’, respond optimally to opponents’ behaviour.1
Our results are the following. In the two-stage Nash Demand Game, there exists
an evolutionary stable outcome where tough players are present. Hence there is inef-
ﬁciency. In this population the net beneﬁt from commitment equals the net beneﬁt
from not being committed. Furthermore, in the limit, as the grid of feasible demands
becomes very ﬁne, there is extreme ineﬃciency: All the surplus is wasted. This, we
believe, is a very strong result, which, to our knowledge, has not been seen in other
models of bargaining under certainty.
In the Ultimatum Game, being in the Proposer role is itself a commitment device.
If Proposers have no speciﬁc information about the Responders’ smallest acceptable
oﬀers, there is only a cost associated with being tough, so in the evolutionarily stable
outcome no player is tough. If, on the other hand, Proposers observe the Responder’s
smallest acceptable oﬀers before the Proposers make oﬀers, evolution favors Respon-
ders who are committed to rejecting low oﬀers. This implies that tough players survive,
as in the two-stage Nash Demand Game.
Our main contribution is to point out that whether bargaining toughness survives
depends on the bargaining protocol. However, another contribution is obtained by
relating our results for the two-stage Nash Demand Game to Ellingsen’s interesting
evolutionary model (Ellingsen (1997)). Here the stage game is the Nash Demand
Game. In his model there are no stable outcomes with toughness and bargaining
is eﬃcient. This striking diﬀerence occurs even though his and our model diﬀer es-
sentially only in the assumption about what happens when the opponent demands
literally all the surplus. Ellingsen assumes that an optimizing player always lets such
an opponent have all the surplus, i.e., the optimizer demands zero. However, note that
the optimizer in this situation is completely indiﬀerent between all feasible demands.
Moreover, the zero demand is weakly dominated, so it seems just as plausible that
the optimizer in this situation would make any (e.g. an arbitrarily small) demand, or
simply randomize. We show that under either assumption there exists an evolutionar-
ily stable strategy with tough behavior. Another insight of this paper is thus to show
1Such a set-up has been analyzed in other papers, e.g. Banerjee and Weibull (1995).
2that in an evolutionary model what goes on at the ’boundary’ of the strategy set can
be crucial for the eﬃciency of bargaining.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we analyze the two-stage
Nash Demand Game and in Section 3 we consider the Ultimatum Game. Section 4
summarizes and Section 5 is the Appendix, which contains all proofs.
2 A two-stage Nash Demand Game
Consider the following two-player two-stage game: Each player makes a demand for a
unit-size surplus at either Stage 1 or Stage 2. If the two demands do not exceed the
surplus, each player gets his demanded share. If the two demands are not compatible,
each player receives zero.
We interpret a demand made at Stage 1 as a commitment to getting a certain share
of the cake. The potential cost of committing oneself to a demand at Stage 1 is that
the opponent does the same and that the two demands turn out to be incompatible.
The potential beneﬁt is that the opponent has decided to make a demand at the second
stage and will, so to speak, simply ’take the rest’.
There is a ﬁnite set of feasible demands that can be made at each stage:
{x0,x1,x2,...,1/2,...,xn−1,xn} = {0,1/n,2/n,...,1/2,...,(n − 1)/n,1} ≡ X.
We assume that n is even (ensuring that 1/2 ∈ X) and n > 2 (such that X contains
more elements than just 0, 1/2 and 1), i.e., n ∈ {4,6,8,...}.
We may think of bargaining as taking place over a sum of money (normalized to
one), with 1/n being the smallest monetary unit. The ’fair’ demand is indexed by
f: xf = 1/2. For simplicity, the demand xi ∈ X, where i = 0,...,n, will be denoted
as i ∈ X. Statements such as xi + xj > 1 will be written as i + j > 1, and so on.
The payoﬀs are those for the Nash Demand Game: If a player demanded x and the
opponent demanded x0, where x,x0 ∈ X, the payoﬀ to the ﬁrst player equals x/(x+x0)
if x + x0 ≤ 1 and equals 0 if x + x0 > 1.2
We will consider the following strategies for the evolutionary game: An i-strategy,
where i = 0,...,n, always demands i ∈ X at Stage 1. The set of i-strategies can be
decomposed as follows: The fair strategy: Make demand f = 1/2 at Stage 1; a soft
strategy: Make a demand i with i = 0,1,...,f − 1 at Stage 1; and a tough strategy:
Make a demand i with i = f + 1,...,n at Stage 1. A player using the optimizing
strategy makes a demand at Stage 2 as follows: If the opponent demanded x < 1
at Stage 1, then demand 1 − x at Stage 2; if the opponent did not make a demand
at Stage 1, then demand one-half at Stage 2. The latter may be justiﬁed as follows:
When the optimizing player learns that the opponent did not make a demand at Stage
1, she concludes (correctly) that the opponent is an optimizer, too. We then assume
that two optimizers play the unique symmetric and Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium,
which is that each player demands one-half.
2We assume that when demands are compatible, a player gets his demanded share plus a propor-
tional share of any surplus that is left on the table. Our results are not sensitive to this assumption.
3We must also specify what an optimizing player does at Stage 2 when the opponent
demanded literally all the surplus at Stage 1. However, as mentioned in the Introduc-
tion, we note that no matter what the optimizer demands, her payoﬀ will be zero.
Furthermore, the zero demand is weakly dominated by all the other demands. We
therefore assume that when the optimizing player learns that the opponent demanded
literally all the surplus at Stage 1, the optimizer makes some ﬁxed and strictly positive
demand at Stage 2. Another assumption, which gives the same results, is that the
optimizer randomly chooses a demand.
We will denote the optimizing strategy as strategy ’o’. The set of strategies for the
evolutionary game is therefore S = I ∪ {o}, where I denotes the set of i-strategies.
Let π(t,u) denote the payoﬀ to a player using strategy t ∈ S when the opponent
uses u ∈ S. If i,j ∈ I, the payoﬀs for the evolutionary game are: π(i,j) = i/(i + j)
if i + j ≤ 1; π(i,j) = 0 if i + j > 1; π(o,i) = 1 − i/n if i < n; π(i,o) = i/n
if i < n; π(o,i) = π(i,o) = 0 if i = n; and, ﬁnally, π(o,o) = 1/2. The evolutionary
selection dynamic is the Replicator Dynamic (Taylor and Jonker (1978))). We will use
the well-known Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) and Neutrally Stable Strategy
(NSS) concepts (Maynard-Smith and Price (1973); Maynard-Smith (1982)) to describe
the stability properties of population behavior for this dynamic. The reader is referred
to e.g. Weibull (1995) for details.
2.1 Tough Behavior
An (n − 1)-player always demands (n − 1)/n > 1/2. The following result shows that
these tough players survive:
Proposition 1 Consider the population where a share (n − 2)/n are tough (n − 1)-
players and the remaining share, 2/n, are optimizers.
(a). This population is the unique Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS). It is
asymptotically stable for the Replicator Dynamic.
(b). The average share of the surplus to a player in the ESS is c = 2(n − 1)/n2.
Thus, in the limit as n → ∞, we have c → 0: There is only conﬂict.
We may interpret this result in terms of the beneﬁts and costs from commitment:
The cost of commitment for a tough player is that he gets zero payoﬀ when he meets
another tough player. The beneﬁt from commitment is that he manages to get more
than half of the surplus when meeting an optimizer. In the evolutionarily stable
population the tough players act as if they maximize the beneﬁts from commitment.
Moreover, the population shares are such that the net beneﬁt from being committed,
i.e., tough, equals the beneﬁts from not being committed, i.e., optimizing. The inef-
ﬁciency result in part (b) is due to the fact that when n increases the share of tough
(n − 1)-players also increases, because they get more when meeting the optimizers.
Since two tough players waste the surplus, this increases disagreement in the pop-
ulation. In the limit, as n → ∞, the surplus is almost completely wasted. Put in
the usual framework of rational players, as n → ∞, both players choose to commit
themselves with probability 1 to demanding all the surplus at Stage 1.
42.2 The ’fair’ outcome
In addition to the ESS described in the previous section, there are stable populations
where players are either fair or optimizing. Then all players divide the surplus equally.
Such a population is stable if there are not too many optimizers. Precisely, any
population where a share s of players are optimizers and the rest are fair players is a
Neutrally Stable Strategy, and hence stable, as long as the share of optimizers satisﬁes
s < n/[2(n − 1)].
In Ellingsen’s model, a very similar result is found. However, in his model there
are no stable outcomes with tough behavior. The reason is that there any population
composed of tough players and optimizing players can be invaded by even tougher
players. In particular, an n-player can invade since the optimizer is assumed to demand
zero when meeting such a player. However, the population with only n-players and
optimizers is also unstable3, as is the population composed only of n-players. We have
thus obtained a qualitatively diﬀerent result than in Ellingsen’s model, only by a small
change in what might seem an innocuous assumption about how optimizing players
react when meeting a player who demands literally all the surplus.
2.3 Multiplicity and evolutionary drift
We have seen that, in addition to the ineﬃcient tough-optimizer ESS, there is an
eﬃcient outcome where fair and optimizing players all make the demand of one-half.
Precisely, there is in the state space a component of populations where players are
either fair or optimizing and where the share of optimizers satisﬁes the inequality
stated at the end of the previous section. Each such population is stable, but not
asymptotically stable: Since the fair and the optimizing players perform equally well
in the population, the population shares of each strategy may unnoticeably change,
due to ’noise’ and other stochastic factors. This phenomenon is called ’evolutionary
drift’; the reader is referred to Binmore and Samuelson (1999). Following that paper,
we may call the component a hanging valley, namely a ﬂat ﬂoor of equilibria with a
’cliﬀ edge’ at one end. At this cliﬀ edge the share of optimizers is such that a tough
(n − 1)-mutant would earn exactly the same as the incumbents; and were the share
of optimizers to increase even more due to evolutionary drift, this mutant can invade.
Then the population (the ’ball’) would be pushed out over the cliﬀ edge and plunge to
the basin of attraction of the ESS. Once there, the ’ball’ rolls down in a pit (the ESS)
and stays there. We expect that in the presence of evolutionary drift, the population
will be observed at the ineﬃcient ESS in the ’ultra-long’ run. The reader is once more
referred to Binmore and Samuelson (1999) for an insightful analysis of diﬀerent time
spans in evolutionary models.
3An n-player performs strictly better against an optimizer, and equally well against another n-
player, as does an optimizer.
53 An Ultimatum Game
The Ultimatum Game diﬀers from the Nash Demand Game in that being Proposer is
itself a commitment device. Intuitively, since Responders can do nothing better than
picking up Proposers’ oﬀers, evolutionary selection should reward those Responders
who accept all oﬀers and so toughness should not be present. Indeed, we will see that
it is only if the Responder’s commitment to rejecting low oﬀers is somehow visible to
the Proposer that toughness is viable.
In the Proposer role a strategy is a demand i ∈ X, as before, with the understand-
ing that 1 − x is the oﬀer to the Responder. In the Responder role, a strategy is a
Smallest Acceptable Oﬀer (SAO): If a Responder uses SAO y she accepts any oﬀer
at least as large as y and otherwise rejects it. We assume that no Responder accepts
an oﬀer of literally zero and that no Responder accepts only an oﬀer of literally all
the surplus. The set of feasible SAOs is thus given by Y = {1/n,2/n,...,(n − 1)/n}.
A strategy is then a pair (i,j) ∈ X × Y , where i ∈ X is the demand made when
Proposer and j ∈ Y is the SAO employed when Responder. The payoﬀs to a player is
a weighted average of the payoﬀs in the Proposer and the Responder role.
We can, as before, decompose the set of (i,j)-strategies in a rather intuitive way:
A strategy (i,j) is balanced if i+j = 1, soft if i+j < 1 and tough if i+j > 1. We may
interpret these strategies as follows: A balanced (soft) [tough] player is committed to
getting half (less than half) [more than half] of the surplus, taken as an average over
the two player roles. Two players using the same tough strategy always disagree. An
(i,j)-player always uses strategy (i,j). An optimizing player makes as Proposer an
optimal oﬀer and accepts any positive oﬀer as Responder. Denoting the optimizing
strategy once more as o and the set of (i,j)-strategies by I, the pure strategy set for
the evolutionary game is I ∪ {o}.
We will distinguish between two scenarios: Scenario 1 is when the Proposer, when
making oﬀers, only knows the distribution of SAOs in the population. Scenario 2 is
when a Proposer, before making an oﬀer, observes what the Responder’s SAO is. Sce-
nario 2 clearly makes a very strong assumption that the Responder’s SAO is perfectly
observable by the Proposer (in Ellingsen’s model it is likewise assumed that a player
can observe what demand the opponent will make).
Proposition 2 (a). Under Scenario 1, there are no tough players in any stable pop-
ulation. Moreover, stability implies eﬃciency.
(b). Under Scenario 2, consider the population where a share (n − 2)/n are tough
(n−1,n−1)-players and the remaining share, 2/n, are optimizers. This population is
the unique ESS. Furthermore, the average share of the cake and its limiting behavior
is exactly as in Proposition 1.
We may interpret this result as follows: Under Scenario 1, the ever-present cost
from being tough is that there is disagreement when such a player meets similar tough
players. The beneﬁt, that one may be able to induce the opponent to give more than
one-half (as an average over the roles), however, is non-existent, since no Proposers
condition oﬀers on the Responder’s SAO. The second part of the proposition follows
6from this: Any population where some Responders turn down oﬀers is unstable, since
players who accept the oﬀers (and make the same oﬀers as Proposer) perform strictly
better.
When Scenario 2 applies, an optimizing Proposer will condition his oﬀer on the
observed SAO. Thus, whenever a Responder faces such a Proposer, the Responder’s
SAO is eﬀectively a demand for a share of the surplus. This means that the beneﬁt
from being tough is now positive. Indeed, the most successful tough players will be
those who ’demand’ the most in each role. We then obtain co-existence between tough
players and optimizers, exactly as in our two-stage Nash Demand Game. There are
also stable (but not asymptotically stable) populations with balanced and optimizing
behavior. Stability requires that there are suﬃciently few optimizers in the population;
the logic behind this condition is exactly the same as the one for the two-stage Nash
Demand Game and the one in Ellingsen (1997). From the argument in Section 2.2,
we predict that evolutionary drift will, with suﬃcient time, bring the population to
the ineﬃcient ESS.
4 Summary
When rational players bargain under certainty commitment and conﬂict is viewed as
anomalous, since the bargainers will exploit gains from trade eﬃciently. However,
studying two bargaining games in an evolutionary context revealed that there can
exist an evolutionarily stable outcome that is (potentially extremely) ineﬃcient. Our
analysis shows that the evolutionary stability of bargaining ’toughness’, and of the as-
sociated ineﬃciency, depends on how the costs and beneﬁts from being tough compare.
This, in turn, depends on the bargaining protocol. These results may be interpreted
as a formalization, in an evolutionary context, of many of the important insights in
Thomas Schelling’s book (Schelling (1960)).
5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
Consider a population with support {o,n − 1} and with s denoting the share
of (n − 1)-players. Expected payoﬀs to the optimizing players and (n − 1)-players
are (1 − s)(1/2) + s(1/n) and (1 − s)[(n − 1)/n], respectively. These are equal at
s = (n − 2)/n ≡ s0. At this population, which we denote by s∗, average payoﬀ is
(1 − s0)[(n − 2)/n] = (2/n) − 2/(n2). Next, let π(p,s∗) denote the expected payoﬀ to
a strategy p ∈ {I ∪ o} at s∗. We verify that any pure strategy p other than o and
n − 1 satisﬁes π(p,s∗) < π(s∗,s∗). In particular, since the optimizer makes a strictly
positive demand when meeting an n-player, we have π(n,s∗) = 0. Thus we have
π(s,s∗) ≤ π(s∗,s∗) for all populations s, so s∗ is a Nash equilibrium. To show that
s∗ is an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) (Maynard-Smith and Price (1973)), and
hence asymptotically stable for the Replicator Dynamic (Taylor and Jonker (1978)), we
must verify that we have π(s∗,s) > π(s,s) for all populations s satisfying π(s,s∗) =
π(s∗,s∗). From above, we need only check this inequality for populations s with
7support in {o,n − 1}. We have π(s∗,s) − π(s,s) = (s0 − s)[π(n − 1,s) − π(o,s)] or,
after some simpliﬁcations, π(s∗,s)−π(s,s) = 2[2((n−1)/n)−1−s]2, This is strictly
positive for any s 6= s0. Hence s∗ is an ESS.
We will also consider the possibility that an optimizer, instead of choosing some
positive ﬁxed demand, randomly chooses a demand when meeting an n-player. Then
the n-player earns π(n,s∗) = [1/(n + 1)](1 − s0) at s∗. Since an (n − 1)-player earns
[(n − 1)/n](1 − s0) = π(s∗,s∗), we have π(n,s∗) < π(s∗,s∗) whenever (n − 1)/n >
1/(n + 1) or n2 − n − 1 > 0. This clearly holds for all n ≥ 4. Thus s∗ is again a Nash
equilibrium and the proof that s∗ is also an ESS is exactly as above. The proof that
this is the unique ESS is given below.
Proof of the stability of fair and optimizing behavior:
Here we prove the claim made in Section 2.2 about the stability of optimizing
and fair behavior. In any population with only fair and optimizing players, average
payoﬀ is one-half. It is not diﬃcult to see that this population is an NSS, and hence
stable, if an (n − 1)-mutant cannot invade. Letting s denote the population share of
optimizers, this is the case when 1/2 > s(n−1)/n. Re-arranging this expression gives
the inequality in the main text.
To prove that the ESS just described is unique, we note that all Nash equilibria
other than the Nash equilibrium s∗ have the following form: A player uses some
mixture of the fair strategy and the optimizing strategy. Of those only the ones who
satisfy the inequality just stated are NSS. However, none of these NSS is an ESS. To
see this, we may note that a mutant using the optimizing strategy is an alternative
best reply and, moreover, the mutant performs as well as the incumbents against the
same mutant. This violates the ESS conditions (the reader is once more referred to
e.g. Weibull (1995) for details). 
Proof of Proposition 2:
Part (a): We prove that any population with tough strategies is unstable. Consider
a population where some players use a tough strategy (i,j). Suppose ﬁrst the oﬀer,
1 − i, is strictly positive, i.e., i < n. An (i,k)-player, with k ≤ 1 − i, then earns the
same in the Proposer role as the (i,j)-player. However, he earns strictly more in the
Responder role, since he, unlike the (i,j)-player, accepts a proposing (i,j)-player’s
strictly positive oﬀer. Thus the (i,k)-player’s expected payoﬀ is strictly larger than
the (i,j)-player’s expected payoﬀ, so the population is unstable. Suppose now i = n,
i.e., the oﬀer is zero. Then an (i,j)-player earns zero as Proposer, since no Responder
accepts the zero oﬀer. Furthermore, a mutant using the strategy (1 − j,j) earns the
same as Responder as the (i,j)-player, but strictly more as Proposer (he gets a share
1−(j/n) > 0 when playing against an (i,j)-player as Proposer). Thus the population is
unstable. To prove that stability implies bargaining eﬃciency, suppose the population
is stable, but that some oﬀers are rejected. Then there is in the population a strategy
(p,q) and a strategy (s,t) with 1 − p < t. Suppose ﬁrst p < n. Then a player using
strategy (s,1 − p) earns a strictly higher expected payoﬀ than a (s,t)-player, since
the former earns a strictly higher payoﬀ in the Responder role than the latter. This
implies that the population is unstable, a contradiction. If p = n, then (n,q) is a
tough strategy, which, from the previous result, again contradicts stability.
8Part (b): Consider a population with support {o,(n − 1,n − 1)} and let s denote
the share of (n − 1,n − 1)-players. The expected payoﬀs to strategy o and strategy
(n − 1,n − 1) are (1 − s)(1/2) + s(1/n) and (1 − s)[(n − 1)/n], respectively. These
expected payoﬀs are equal at s = (n − 2)/n. As before, we call this population s∗.
We note that this population is exactly the same as the ESS for the two-stage Nash
Demand Game, so the average payoﬀ is also the same. To verify that s∗ is a Nash
equilibrium, consider any pure strategy p other than (n − 1,n − 1) and o. We note
that if p is an alternative, or superior, best reply to s∗, then p must be tougher than
(n−1,n−1). Thus we need only check the strategy (n,n−1). However, this strategy
earns zero in the Proposer role, since no Responder accepts the zero oﬀer. Thus s∗
is a Nash equilibrium. The proof that s∗ is the unique ESS is exactly as the proof of
Proposition 1. 
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